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ABSTRACT 
From the beginning of Northern Ireland’s Troubles, two different strands of 
British intelligence were developed in Northern Ireland that failed to 
effectively cooperate or coordinate their efforts with one another. Though 
the JIC, the Office of the UK Representative and later the Northern Ireland 
Office were all aware of (and often opposed) the lack of singular control over 
intelligence in the province, they were unable to wrest control of security 
intelligence from the hands of the Army and Special Branch. This problem, 
which emerged as a result of both the developing nature of the deployment 
in the early 1970s and from the fear of alienating RUC Special Branch meant 
that a Security-Forces-controlled intelligence ‘stovepipe’ emerged that 
exclusively served the purpose of enforcing law and order rather than aiding 
in the UK government’s wider political strategies. Records from the UK 
National Archives show that at times this stovepipe operated without 
reference (and at times in opposition) to the political initiatives also being 
tried by the UK government in the province. 
 
The Northern Ireland Troubles (c.1968-1998) was a rapidly changing conflict in its early 
stages. The nature of the deployment of the British army in August 1969 to ‘aid the civil 
power’ (i.e. the devolved, Unionist controlled, Northern Ireland Government) led to a 
confused response by both the United Kingdom (UK) and Northern Ireland (NI) governments 
and their respective institutions which resulted in the UK’s intelligence agencies responding 
to the situation along separate policy pathways. The UK government’s Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) consistently recognised that this was a problem, preferring a more unified 
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intelligence approach to that which was emerging in Northern Ireland. However, when in 
March 1972 Direct Rule from London was introduced, the JIC, along with the Northern 
Ireland Office (established by the UK to govern the province) had great difficulty in 
retrieving overall control of intelligence from the security forces. This article argues that as 
the British Army increasingly found itself involved in fighting an insurgency in Northern 
Ireland, so they became ever more reliant on the supply of operational intelligence from the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary’s (RUC) Special Branch as well as from their own intelligence 
gatherers and analysts. And whilst this kind of intelligence was essential in mounting 
offensive as well as defensive operations, it was recognised more widely that intelligence as 
both an act and a product had utility in the political as well as the military realm. Thus, the 
defensive attitudes within the Ministry of Defence led to the development of a Security 
Force stovepipe which excluded those involved in political intelligence and which persisted 
despite the imposition of Direct Rule from Westminster in 1972. This stovepipe (with the 
exception of one important period when Alan Rowley was Director of Intelligence) 
effectively divided political from security intelligence in Northern Ireland despite their 
shared aims. Furthermore, in spite of the relative success of political intelligence operations 
(the Laneside group obtaining two IRA ceasefires between 1972 and 1975) the closure of 
the Laneside operation and the adoption of the polices of Police Primacy, Normalisation and 
Criminalisation after 1975 meant that throughout the late 1970s and until the late 1980s 
security intelligence become often solely predominant. It was not until the late 1980s, when 
a more nuanced multi-agency counter terrorism strategy was developed, that another 
nascent peace process would emerge, and one that would finally bring the conflict to at 
least a semblance of a conclusion.  
STOVEPIPING INTELLIGENCE 
The problem of intelligence ‘stovepipes’ was first officially conceptualised in a 1996 US 
Congress Select Committee study describing the circumstances in which various forms of 
intelligence (and their collection disciplines) are managed so separately that they become 
virtually independent from one another.1 The problem with stovepipes being that lateral 
movement or the sharing of intelligence, skills, or even opinions between the variously 
tasked institutions becomes impossible or is at least frowned upon because of ‘the fact that 
each discipline is managed with a great deal of independence from the others.’2 Though the 
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problem of intelligence stovepipes was illustrated in this 1996 report, it was not tackled with 
any urgency in the US until the 9/11 Commission Report demonstrated clearly that the issue 
had become acute and had contributed toward the intelligence failures surrounding the 
9/11 attacks of 2001:  
‘The problem is nearly intractable because of the way the government is 
currently structured. Lines of operational authority run to the expanding 
executive departments, and they are guarded for understandable reasons: the 
DCI commands the CIA’s personnel overseas; the secretary of defense will not 
yield to others in conveying commands to military forces; the Justice Department 
will not give up the responsibility of deciding whether to seek arrest warrants. 
But the result is that each agency or department needs its own intelligence 
apparatus to support the performance of its duties. It is hard to “break down 
stovepipes” when there are so many stoves that are legally and politically 
entitled to have cast-iron pipes of their own.’3 
The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the subsequent Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), established three new institutions in the US that hoped to 
prevent the emergence of stovepipes among the US intelligence community in the future. 
These are and remain the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the US Joint 
Intelligence Community Council and the National Counterterrorism Centre and all have the 
express function of ensuring intelligence is shared among those who require it, both analysts 
and policymakers, so that the problems associated with intelligence stovepipes can be 
minimised.   
In Britain, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) has, since 1936, theoretically ensured 
intelligence is shared among managers across the intelligence community by drawing on all 
available intelligence as well as diplomatic reporting and open source intelligence. The JIC 
has its own assessment staff and secretariat and meets weekly in a committee made up of 
the heads of all UK services (Defence Intelligence, MI5, MI6 and GCHQ) along with senior 
officials at the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. However, as with 
the DNI in the United States, the JIC does not have any direct control over the agencies who 
supply it with intelligence, nor do they have any indirect power over budgets in order to 
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influence the intelligence agencies who remain under the direct control of their parent 
government departments. Tradition, wisdom, and professional courtesy aside, therefore 
Britain’s intelligence community has always remained susceptible, theoretically, to the 
stovepiping of its constituent agencies most especially when their own interests have been 
at stake.  
Examples exist of stovepiping in many modern and historic counter insurgency campaigns 
and are clearly apparent in the effect of so-called ‘surge’ strategies used in both Iraq (2007) 
and Afghanistan (2009)4.  In both these instances, military primacy and the adherent 
demand for actionable military intelligence has served to delegitimise other areas of state 
activity and deprive these other authorities of access to information that they might have 
used effectively to inform policy development. Stovepipes develop therefore even if the 
ultimate long-term goals of all organisations, generating, analysing and disseminating 
intelligence remain the same and, when active participants in a conflict, can even serve as 
spoilers, actively preventing the emergence of nascent peace processes by too aggressively 
pursuing an enemy that other components of the state are attempting to draw away from a 
conflict.5  
 
THE UK’S RESPONSE TO NORTHERN IRELAND’S CIVIL RIGHTS CRISIS 
The separate and divergent strands of intelligence in Northern Ireland emerged from the UK 
government’s response to the unique character of the conflict and the way in which it 
emerged in the late 1960s. The widely publicised injustices and discrimination against the 
Catholic minority in Northern Ireland were acknowledged (if not resolved) by a series of 
piecemeal reforms of the Unionist NI prime minister Terence O’Neill. This led to a degree of 
instability among both the Catholic working class and more radical left wing groups in 
Northern Ireland who felt these reforms were not enough. In response those in the 
Protestant, Unionist and Loyalist working class felt the civil rights campaign was a cover for a 
resurgence of Irish republicanism and undermining the union with Britain. By 1968, 
increasingly radical groups of civil-rights activists under the umbrella of the Northern Ireland 
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Civil Rights Association (NICRA) were seeking an end to official discrimination against 
Catholics by way of their three main demands:  
1. The end of the rate payer’s franchise and its replacement by universal suffrage 
at local government elections (the demand known as ‘One Man, One Vote’).    
2. The introduction of anti-discrimination legislation covering public employment. 
3. The repeal of the Special Powers Act that had been used to curtail political 
opposition movements since the establishment of the state.6 
The aims of the Civil Rights Movement were vehemently opposed by increasing numbers 
within the majority unionist community including members of Northern Ireland’s cabinet. 
Loyalist paramilitary groups also began to emerge and their campaign of violence began 
with their first murders in May 1966.7   
Although British Prime Minister Harold Wilson had been aware of the issues surrounding the 
civil rights campaign in Northern Ireland since at least the UK general election of October 
1964.8 Once he was elected UK prime minister in 1964, Wilson’s practical understanding of 
the problem led him to prevaricate, rather than take action on the matter. Thus, Wilson 
avoided the issue in public and kept his growing concern a largely private matter. Where 
discord happened, it did so behind closed doors.   
Symptomatic of Wilson’s early approach was his response to a meeting between Eddie 
McAteer (leader of the Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland) and Lord Stonham (Minister of 
State at the Home Office) which raised the issue of how UK troops would be controlled if 
called to assist the Northern Ireland government in November 1968.9 Wilson responded 
quickly10 but quietly to ensure that all British Army units would refer to the Ministry of 
Defence, ‘before acceding to any request for use of troops in aid of the civil power.’11 Wilson 
reason to distrust the Northern Ireland government, who had form in exaggerating the 
threats there. During the spring of 1966 for example, he had agreed to the supply of troops 
in order to prevent what PM O’Neill had privately warned would be a large scale Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) campaign similar to a previous campaign begun in 1956.12 Nothing of 
the sort envisaged in O’Neill’s letter however took place though it emerged later that the 
Northern Ireland government had been planning a swoop of IRA suspects using Special 
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Powers legislation all along. This report’s author, soon-to-be Chief of the General Staff Sir 
Geoffrey Baker worried that this kind of act, ‘would lay us [i.e. the UK government] open to 
blame for provocation of any disturbance or violence that might follow these arrests.’13  
In August 1969 therefore, when the request for help from the military was finally made, the 
British Army was introduced to aid the Northern Ireland government, but was controlled 
solely by London. Seen initially as non-partisan by the nationalist/catholic community, a brief 
honeymoon period saw not only the Army beginning to gather its own operational 
intelligence (e.g. on planned demonstrations) but also delve into peace building by exploiting 
political contacts closely linked with local defence and paramilitary groups. One such 
example was the so-called ‘Sullivan-Dyball treaty’ of September 196914 in which a group of 
Catholic vigilantes in Belfast agreed to remove their barricades and combine their patrols 
with the British Army but to the exclusion of the RUC.15  
Civil servants as well as troops were sent as the British government increased the amount of 
monitoring of the Northern Ireland government in this time. Indeed, as early as 21 April 
1969 a Cabinet Office committee had instructed the Joint Intelligence Committee to consult 
with the Home Office ‘on the means for obtaining information other than through the 
Northern Ireland official sources.’16 This led to the Security Service (MI5) sending over a 
Security Liaison Officer (SLO) to supplement the existing tiny coterie investigating loyalist 
groups and create a more direct link with RUC Special Branch that would report both on the 
security threat and on the police’s performance in dealing with it. The MI5 SLO became 
Britain’s first independent source of information in Northern Ireland (independent that is 
from the Unionist Northern Ireland Government though still reliant on the RUC) and a key 
part of what the JIC chairman Sir Edward Peck described as the ‘slightly better intelligence 
service on Northern Ireland’.17 In August, reporting was increased again when, alongside the 
troops, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) supplied Oliver Wright, a senior 
diplomat, for the newly formed post of ‘UK Representative’ in Belfast. Finally, on 28 August, 
the General Officer Commanding [GOC] (Lt. Gen Sir Ian Freeland) was granted a Director of 
Intelligence (DI) responsible to him, but in ‘close touch with Mr Oliver Wright.’18  These 
parallel and overlapping appointments – made in haste during a period when it was 
uncertain how long the crisis would last – were the ad hoc foundations upon which the 
security and intelligence stovepipe would soon be built.  
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FROM PEACE KEEPING TO COUNTER INSURGENCY, NORTHERN IRELAND 1969-1973.  
The further deterioration of Northern Ireland’s security situation following the honeymoon 
period from August 1969 to roughly March 1970 is well documented elsewhere19 though it 
remains important that the key mile stones are pointed out as it was the changing nature of 
the conflict that made the intelligence reporting structures (described above) so inadequate 
so quickly. Following the initial deployment of troops in order to stop the civil rights crisis 
turning into a sectarian feud, the IRA split into its ‘Official’ and ‘Provisional’ wings in 
December 1969 with the Provisional IRA in particular vowing to go on the offensive now that 
British troops were on the streets.20 By April 1970 the GOC, faced with nightly riots in Belfast 
and Derry coincidental with an ever stiffer army resolve that exacerbated the violence they 
faced, warned that rioters armed with petrol bombs could be shot dead, though the 
response more usually consisted of the firing of CS gas.21 By June, gun and bomb attacks, by 
both wings of the IRA had begun to supplement and replace the riots as the main threat to 
the British Army. Therefore on 3 July 1970, in order to seize these weapons the British Army 
effectively imposed a curfew on the Catholic Falls Road in Belfast to conduct house to house 
searches, in doing so alienating the local populations permanently.22           
By 1971, despite many of the political reforms demanded by the Civil Rights Campaign 
having been conceded, the security situation continued to decline and internment without 
trial was introduced for suspected IRA members and other political radicals. The backlash 
against the internment policy continued for months, and the British army’s operations 
increasingly took on the complexion of a classic Counter Insurgency until, on Bloody Sunday 
(30 January 1972) 13 civilians were shot dead at an anti-internment march in Derry, and a 
full-blown insurgency for a period arguably began. The Stormont Government was 
suspended in March 1972 and Direct Rule of the province was imposed by the British 
government.  
Direct Rule alone did not create stability or improve security. By the end of 1972, 212 
members of the Security Forces, 113 paramilitaries and 366 civilians23 had died in the 
Northern Ireland Troubles since the deployment of troops to aid the civil power there in 
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1969. Of these, 300 had been killed in the nine months following Direct Rule. Recent 
academic debate on the nature and severity of sectarianism within the IRA might disagree 
on a number of issues24, but a broader consensus has emerged that the IRA consciously 
targeted ‘individuals whom they deemed to be in some measure actively contributing to 
persisting British control in Ireland.’25 The Army still had the role of peace keeper between 
Loyalist and Republican armed groups, but were being targeted in particular by the 
resurgent Provisional IRA as part of a renewed war for Irish unification. Thus the intelligence 
the security forces sought was influenced by their own urgent need for effective defence. 
The product generated therefore needed to be practical, urgent and actionable when it 
came to the identities and activities of republican paramilitaries, whether or not these were 
representative of the conflict as a whole, and without reference to the potential for that 
intelligence to be useful to those outside the army or police who were seeking political ways 
that the conflict might be brought to an end. This short-sightedness is illustrated by Eunan 
O’Halpin, who has highlighted both the severity of the security threat loyalist paramilitaries 
posed as well as the degree to which the JIC ignored that threat.26  But the JIC were merely 
at the end of an intelligence stovepipe that considered reporting to the JIC often irrelevant 
and who were consistently overlooking the wider political utility of their product, perceiving 
the conflict solely (and erroneously) as being one between the Provisional IRA and the British 
state alone. By mid 1972 therefore the reality was that the initial mission of the army to aid 
the civil power in Northern Ireland and restore law and order to the province had been 
replaced by a more urgent need to defeat the IRA. The change in the nature of the 
deployment thus led to a change in the aims of the forces deployed. Just as Mockaitis argues 
that a change in circumstances can lead to a change in the understanding of what 
constitutes minimum force in an insurgency27 so too this change in aim did not need to be 
reflected in any formal adjustment to the intelligence arrangements for Northern Ireland in 
order to have taken place. Security intelligence was naturally shaping itself to meet the 
demands for usable intelligence from the Security Forces themselves – in other words doing 
what they perceived to be their job. Thus, a security intelligence stovepipe emerged that was 
more sensitive to the needs of its immediate consumers than to any other aspect of the 
state’s response.  
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NORTHERN IRELAND’S SECURITY STOVEPIPE 
The security stovepipe emerged as a result of the posting of the MI5 Security Liaison Officer 
(SLO) assigned to RUC Headquarters in April 1969 and who was joined from August 1969 by 
increasing numbers of military intelligence personnel who, in turn were coordinated by the 
Director of Intelligence (another MI5 officer) appointed at the end of that month. However, 
whilst MI5 could claim to have been there first, the GOC (Freeland) in order to stop the 
Northern Ireland Government from gaining operational control over the British Army was 
given full control over all security matters in the province as soon as troops were deployed 
and this control extended to all the existing intelligence systems. The post of Director of 
Intelligence had even been established at Freeland’s request, his having told the Chief of the 
General Staff that he, ‘would welcome a Director of Intelligence … who would be answerable 
solely to him.’28 Freeland’s choice of words were reflected in the new Director of 
Intelligence’s Terms of Reference which began, ‘You will be responsible to the GOC…’29  
Thus, the SLO, Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO) and even much of RUC Special 
Branch initially were under Freeland’s operational control30 which could only have had a 
detrimental impact on morale within police Special Branch.   Within days of their arrival 
however, the domestic situation had improved to such an extent that there was relatively 
little to report on and, as late as October 1969 even future MI5 Director General (DG) Stella 
Rimington admitted that her information coming from Northern Ireland – while significant in 
size – ‘did not at this stage contain much in the way of real intelligence’.31 
So too, the JIC in London strained to hear information from the Director of Intelligence that 
had been appointed in Belfast, largely because he was now responsible to the GOC. The JIC 
requested weekly assessments, that were reduced to fortnightly, and when even these were 
not forthcoming, Sir Martin Furnival-Jones, the MI5 DG was asked to see if the DI (an MI5 
officer after all) required ‘secretarial support’.32 The JIC secretary, Brian Stewart, responded 
in October 1969 with the establishment of a Northern Ireland Current Intelligence Group 
which would in theory give the RUC Special Branch direct representation at the JIC33 though 
little changed as a result.   
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Another reason for the lack of reporting and liaison likely originated in the confused nature 
of the initial deployment. MI5 and the British Army were used to working with each other 
and alongside local police special branches in colonial conflicts in Malaya, Kenya, Aden and 
Cyprus and had come to prioritise the building of these relationships above the reporting 
demands of a far-off Whitehall particularly as the GOC was so often given blanket control 
over security. Imperial conflicts rarely garnered the kinds of day-to-day headlines the crisis in 
Northern Ireland had and rarer still had they threatened the security of mainland Britain so 
readily as Irish republicans. Therefore the intelligence officers there may have been less 
aware of the JIC’s (and the Cabinet’s) concern. Still, as time went on, it became clearer that 
the JIC had a real problem in obtaining regular intelligence assessments from the Director of 
Intelligence there. MI5’s Director General, Furnival-Jones was again in Northern Ireland in 
January 197034 and, following a brief respite, it was apparent that the system of reporting 
had again begun to break down. In June 1970, another draft assessment was late at the 
exact moment that the security situation began deteriorating once more.35 By October, with 
the honeymoon now completely over, the JIC moved to expand their Current Intelligence 
Group by replacing the original Director of Intelligence by the newly arrived SLO, David 
Eastwood MC.36 While the JIC worked to build up a new system of reporting, they also began 
to acknowledge the limitations of using the Director of Intelligence’s reports as an all-source 
analysis even changing the name of the Northern Ireland Current Intelligence Group to the 
Ireland Current Intelligence Group, to denote sources of intelligence presumably now 
arriving from beyond Northern Ireland.37 A change of personnel however did not change the 
problem of non-reporting from the Director of Intelligence and twice in October assessments 
or commentary were, once again, late in coming from Belfast.38   
In March 1971 the JIC again reviewed the intelligence arrangements for Northern Ireland 
and the Intelligence Co-ordinator, Sir Dick White was sent over and reported back.39 
Although White’s report (drafted by JIC Secretary Brian Stewart)40 remains classified, 
excerpts from it do appear in the archives and its recommendations clearly influenced future 
considerations of both the introduction of internment and the risk of a Protestant backlash 
should the Northern Ireland Government be replaced by Direct Rule from Westminster.41 
White auspiciously noted, ‘It is important to emphasise that there was not an intelligence 
crisis in Northern Ireland.’ 42 Before writing that RUC Special Branch was, ‘the crux of the 
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machine’ and that as a result of it being ‘the object over the last two years of close scrutiny 
and heavy criticism, it was thus in a highly sensitive state.’43  White believed therefore that 
there were ‘weaknesses in the direction, collection and collation of security intelligence’ 
within the RUC though still, he felt able to conclude that ‘however much we improve our 
own arrangements, there cannot be a consequential radical improvement in the intelligence 
situation as a whole [without RUC SB improvement]… the army’s contribution is probably 
only about 10% of the total intelligence take – the balance being principally from RUC SB.’44  
In further excerpts from White’s actual report two recommendations appear. The first, was 
that whilst it was important that there should be ‘a better balance between the two partners 
in the overall intelligence system in Northern Ireland… it will be imperative to carry the 
Northern Ireland police with us and retain every bit of their confidence’45 in the event of 
Direct Rule. Second, was that once the intelligence was in a state that would enable it and, 
‘after a lull in its expectation, an internment policy could be expected to yield considerable 
intelligence dividends.’46  
 White’s report effectively tied the hands of the JIC, MI5 and even the British Army. By 
emphasising both their importance and fragility of RUC Special Branch White was making it 
clear that no one could afford to upset them and that Special Branch could not be made to 
report back to the JIC if they were unable to do so for any reason. This problem of a non-
reporting RUC Special Branch, whether it stemmed from inadequacy or a more general 
unwillingness to co-operate47 only got worse over time and, as the casualty lists mounted, 
both the military and police commanders involved might well have felt reporting to 
Whitehall came a poor second to gently squeezing out of the RUC the operational and 
actionable intelligence that the Security Forces needed for themselves.  
Perhaps nowhere are the limits and inadequacies of the security intelligence set-up in 
Northern Ireland more evident than in Operation Demetrius, the introduction of internment, 
which took place on the morning of 9 August 1971. The arrest operation, furnished by 
intelligence gathered predominantly by RUC Special Branch netted 342 of the 520 suspects 
on their list in the first 24 hours.48 Evidence of success however was an illusion with 105 of 
the 342 lifted on the first night being released within two days and, as time went on it 
emerged that the list was both inflated and out of date including a number of members of 
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left-wing organisations49 as well as long-retired former republican paramilitaries.50 Richard 
English would later estimate that ‘Fewer than a hundred of [those arrested initially] were 
either Provisional or Official IRA Volunteers.’51 And even Prime Minister Ted Heath, though 
himself initially convinced of the operation’s success later admitted that the intelligence 
supplied by RUC Special Branch had proven to be ‘hopelessly out of date.’52 
Though the Director of Intelligence had no responsibility for the arrest lists, or subsequently 
who was selected for the enhanced interrogation methods53 that would prove so 
controversial; it is clear that the implementation of the recommendations Dick White had 
made in March was at least partly the DI’s responsibility and he was drawn into the 
maelstrom of controversy that emerged once word that the ‘Five Techniques’54 had been 
used got out in the autumn of 1971. For example, under arrangements made by the DI a 
group of at least ten RUC interrogators had been trained at the Joint Services Interrogation 
Wing at Ashford, Kent since White’s report in the spring. However, even some in the army 
were questioning the wisdom of handing over such an ’exceptionally sensitive’ operation to 
the RUC, urging the DI to ‘strongly advise’ the RUC that they follow the JIC directives on 
interrogation laid down in 1965 ‘to provide at least some cover to reduce the inevitable 
recrimination’.55 Though no indication of this advice being passed on to the RUC has been 
identified, its relevance rings true in the minority report of the Parker Committee (the 
second of two government inquiries conducted on the issue in its immediate aftermath) 
where Lord Gardiner concluded: 
‘The blame for this sorry story… must lie with those who, many years ago in 
decided that in emergency conditions in Colonial-type situations we should 
abandon our legal, well-tried and highly successful wartime interrogation 
methods and replace them by procedures which were secret, illegal, not morally 
justifiable and alien...’56  
Despite the controversy, some justification might still have been found had there been an 
‘operational dividend’ from using the Five Techniques and reports were submitted in 
defence of the methods based on their results in terms of the operational intelligence they 
had gathered. This, ends justifying means argument, included the details of planned IRA 
operations, IRA order of battle and the location of arms caches and safe houses. According 
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to one report, the techniques had resulted in ‘over 40 outstanding major incidents [being] 
cleared from Police records.’57 Most apparent however is the positive effect of the 
internment policy on army morale and confidence. That the army felt that they were now 
winning the war of attrition after August 1971 is sustained by their own internal 
communications if not by the incident statistics which showed the IRA were becoming more 
rather than less active.58 The opportunity to participate more actively in the conflict may 
have given the troops a better sense of purpose but it did little to shorten or ameliorate the 
conflict at this point.  
Caught in the middle however, the DI, Eastwood, became exhausted by the pressure of his 
office. Following yet another visit from Dick White in November 1971, a direct and urgent 
request was made to the Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend asking that MI5 insist on Eastwood 
accepting another assistant immediately. White told Trend that, ‘as soon as the Security 
Service reinforcement gets going it should be possible to persuade [Eastwood] to a further 
break’59 so exhausted the DI had become since internment began.  
In a number of respects, the internment policy and its results can be seen as a case study in 
stovepiped intelligence failure. After the initial operation, the optimistic army reports meant 
for the internal consumption of the managers within the security forces hid the external 
controversy and two British Government reports60 into internment only served to make 
security intelligence even more defensive about its product, activities and outcomes. Beyond 
increasingly strained attempts at pinning the IRA down there is little to no consideration in 
these documents of intelligence serving any wider, political or strategic purpose (these 
separate efforts will be explained below). Furthermore, the attempts to shield the strategic 
failure of internment by promoting its operational success did little to convince anyone 
outside the police and army that internment had meant they had turned a corner in the 
conflict. Finally, the reluctance of RUC Special Branch to resort to the Five Techniques 
further after August 197161 indicates that even they were unconvinced the same intelligence 
could not be gathered by less controversial means and subsequently for a time restricted 
their use of even the new interrogation methods for fear of prosecution.62 The political 
failure however was most obvious and the policy led directly to the escalation of republican 
violence in Belfast and Derry and an increase in support for the IRA throughout Ireland. 
McCleery has recently demonstrated that the conflict emerged for the first time on any 
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meaningful scale in the towns of Lurgan, Newry, Dungannon and Enniskillen during the 
backlash against internment.63  None of this was an unanticipated consequence, it had for 
example been clearly spelled out in a warning from Britain’s ambassador in Dublin that once 
internment was introduced, ‘all the moderates would identify with the internees.’64 
Subsequently the ambassador wrote directly to the UK Representative in Belfast, Howard 
Smith, asking that Protestant extremists be included and that once republican ring-leaders 
had been rounded up the army should ‘operate with as light a touch as possible’65 cognisant 
of the propaganda effect the policy was already having in the south.  
 
POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
The well documented failures of the security forces to stem a rising tide of violence in 
Northern Ireland in this period are not reflected in the performance other areas of the UK 
government’s deployment. Howard Smith as UK Representative (UKREP) was not a part of 
the security intelligence stovepipe that had emerged around the Director of Intelligence, the 
army and RUC Special Branch. The Office of the UKREP, had been established at the behest 
of PM Harold Wilson to monitor the implementation of internal reforms by the Northern 
Ireland government after the deployment of troops there and was led between 1969 and 
1972 by a series of three senior diplomats, Oliver Wright, Ronnie Burroughs and Howard 
Smith. These UKREPs had a more general reporting role as well and began almost 
immediately to seek out the opinions of those beyond the unionist government at Stormont. 
Though largely using open source or freely given information, the UKREP was effectively 
gathering and analysing political intelligence and was in the process of creating channels of 
information on Northern Ireland that were uniquely detached from sources supplied by or 
through the Northern Ireland government. 
The letters, reports and despatches of the UKREP were distributed around the ‘Irish Net’ at 
Whitehall (clearance coded ‘PERIMETER’ to exclude Northern Ireland officials from reading 
them) and this included all the same people privy to the security intelligence reporting.66 
These political intelligence reports however began to diverge from security intelligence 
perceptions from the summer of 1971 over the issue of internment and their analyses of its 
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success. Howard Smith, was the final UKREP (a Bletchley Park alumni, later ambassador in 
Moscow and MI5 DG 1979-81) and urged caution over the perceived efficacy of internment 
just weeks before its introduction when he wrote to the Home Office, ‘I do not believe that 
internment alone in Northern Ireland would do the trick…[as] in my judgement a 
considerable capacity for terror would remain.’67 Similar opposition was voiced by MI5 who 
advocated the internment of loyalist paramilitaries as ‘a sop for the minority community’ 
and its application over only the Greater Belfast area.68   
With internment in place and the army reports now conflating their own increased COIN 
success with an actual decline in the insurgency, opposition from the UKREP only increased 
with the appointment of MI6’s Frank Steele as Smith’s deputy in October 1971. Steele took a 
practical and ecumenical approach to the post of Deputy UKREP, later justifying his methods 
on the basis that on a recent posting to Kenya he had worked with Jomo Kenyatta (‘one of 
our staunchest friends in the world’) who had previously been interned by the British 
because of his ‘links with the Mau Mau’ prior to Kenyan independence. The Mau Mau, 
according to Steele, ‘made the IRA look like a Sunday school choir’ therefore, ‘to people like 
me it seemed just pragmatic to talk to the IRA.’69  Within a fortnight of his arrival Steele was 
reporting valuable news from moderates within the nationalist community, who were 
directly contradicting the army’s line that they were winning, ‘they [the moderate 
nationalists70] themselves were not as optimistic about this… [and] they also commented 
that [the army] were not taking sufficient care in winning the security battle to minimize the 
political damage incurred in doing this.’71  
The difference in approach between the approach of the UKREP group and the MI5/Military 
Intelligence/RUC group is perhaps best illustrated in the treatment of the PIRA Adjutant 
Frank Morris on 9 February 1972 when he reported to Victoria RUC Barracks in Derry. There, 
Morris delivered a message from PIRA Chief of Staff Sean MacStíofáin proposing a truce 
between the IRA and the British Army. The Director of Intelligence added comments to the 
minute, ‘This approach must be viewed in the context of increasing security force pressure 
on the IRA in Belfast where I expect their activities to be reduced to a minimum in six to 
eight weeks’ time.’72 The contact with Morris was subsequently allowed to lapse.  In 
contrast, following similar contact that spring Frank Steele was to organise talks that 
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resulted in a PIRA ceasefire and, after talks with the Secretary of State at Cheyne Walk in 
London when the IRA delegation was led by MacStíofáin.  
Before his death in 1997, Steele made clear how stark the differences were between the 
views of political intelligence and security intelligence at this time when he told journalist 
Peter Taylor; 
‘There was very little coordination of whatever intelligence was being produced 
by the RUC, the army and MI5. Internment had been a disaster. It barely 
damaged the IRA’s command structure and led to a flood of recruits, money and 
weapons. It was a farce. And as for the special interrogation techniques, they 
were damned stupid as well as morally wrong. Such methods are counter-
productive and do you enormous damage when they get out, which they 
inevitably do. And in practical terms, the additional usable intelligence they 
produced was, I understand, minimal.’73  
 
THE JIC AND INTELLIGENCE ARRANGEMENTS IN NORTHERN IRELAND AFTER DIRECT RULE  
Following Bloody Sunday, the advance toward Direct Rule was swift. But whilst little changed 
in the overall intelligence arrangements initially, within a few months the new Northern 
Ireland Office began to seek greater civilian control over the very security matters that had 
been withdrawn from the Northern Ireland government in 1969. The NIO began making its 
case to the JIC for greater input and access to intelligence in mid-April 1972. The NIO, 
arguing, ‘It is certainly the case that the D of I could not have been responsible to the civil 
authorities in NI before direct rule…[although] intelligence is valuable not only to the army: 
it is also a source of essential information for policy making.’74  
The origin of the NIO was closely linked to the Office of the UKREP though for a brief time in 
1972 both operated in parallel. Howard Smith and Frank Steele therefore both remained for 
a time working in the offices of the UKREP at Laneside on the shores of Belfast Lough75 
though they now reported to the Secretary of State.  Halliday of the NIO believed the 
information this group collected and the good counsel they provided could be leveraged by 
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further access to security intelligence and he continued this logic, ‘It can therefore be argued 
that the DofI should be made as responsible to the Secretary of State as he is to the GOC.’76 
The Chiefs of Staff however had claimed control over the Director of Intelligence in their 
rewriting of the GOC’s directive as director of operations just five days before Direct Rule 
was imposed, clearly describing the DI position once again as being under the GOC; 
‘Your dealings with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (or where 
appropriate his senior representative in Northern Ireland) on intelligence 
matters will be direct or by your Director of Intelligence acting for you.’77 
This memo, approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 27 March, (i.e. the day before 
Direct Rule came about) was an attempt to get ahead of the Northern Ireland Office laying 
any claim over intelligence, as the post of Secretary of State for Northern Ireland did not yet 
exist when the document was written and approved.  However, whilst few in either the JIC 
or the NIO felt that the Secretary of State required more than consultation on intelligence 
matters initially78 this began to change as the weeks went by.  
By May 1972 it became apparent that the proposed terms of reference for the Director of 
Intelligence would not be approved by the NIO unless significant changes were made. A note 
by Denis Trevelyan at the NIO to his Permanent Under-Secretary Sir William Nield spelled a 
different stance from that taken in April, arguing the system might be geared ‘towards 
providing political as well as the more conventional military and security intelligence.’ 
Trevelyan argued that using the Official Joint Security Committee in Belfast to select targets 
for intelligence collection and supplying ‘Mr Steel (sic)’ with ‘a good deal of “raw” material in 
addition to prepared assessments.’79 Nield responded with an ‘urgent request’ to London 
that partly resulted in the establishment of an Irish Joint Section staffed by both MI5 and 
MI6 personnel.80 
Had this proposal been accepted fully however it would have placed Frank Steele at the 
heart (if not the head) of intelligence in Northern Ireland demoting significantly the Director 
of Intelligence, David Eastwood. The proposal would not only replace the Army with the NIO 
as the lead intelligence customer, but also a seconded officer from MI5 with one from MI6 
(i.e. Eastwood would be replaced by Steele) as the lead provider of that intelligence. The 
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disagreement undoubtedly led to delay as the secretariat of the JIC drafted and redrafted 
several new terms of reference through May and June 1972.81  
Meanwhile, the brief PIRA ceasefire from 26 June to 9 July 1972 demonstrated the efficacy 
of the parallel diplomacy and political intelligence that Steele had been conducting since 
October 197182 and at a time when otherwise, ‘the security forces and intelligence services 
were in some disarray, and were losing control in Northern Ireland’.83  Knowledge of the 
NIO’s role in talks with the IRA further fuelled the NIO’s argument to replace Eastwood as DI.  
At the JIC however Defence Intelligence Chief and Deputy JIC Chair, Air Marshal Sir Harold 
Maguire along with Lt Gen Willison and MI5, successfully argued for more emphasis to be 
given to operational intelligence on the IRA.84 Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend intervened to 
form a sub-committee that would ordinarily have been chaired by the Intelligence Co-
ordinator but in whose absence, Maguire of Defence Intelligence chaired. Maguire tabled a 
proposal creating the post of Director and Co-ordinator of Intelligence (DCI) that would 
replace the DI but who ‘should not be burdened with responsibility for political or 
psychological warfare.’85 This adjustment effectively ended the NIO’s attempts to access 
security intelligence and within a month, a designate DCI from MI5 was appointed and was 
briefing the JIC on his plans. Unexpected ill health and the inability of MI5 to find someone 
senior enough to take his place86 however meant this plan backfired and, by happenstance, 
Alan Rowley from MI6 was chosen instead and sent as the first DCI in October 1972.  
 
THE DIRECTOR AND CO-ORDINATOR OF INTELLIGENCE 
British Intelligence in Northern Ireland in the Autumn of 1972 faced a series of scandals and 
failures which, along with being politically damaging, claimed the lives of civilians as well as 
its own personnel and all of which can be linked back to the activities and requirements of 
military intelligence. From October to December 1972, the Littlejohn Affair, followed by the 
Wyman/Crinnian affair were both linked to the Ministry of Defence87 who were running 
formal and informal agents inside the Republic of Ireland. A number of deaths were also 
linked to the patrols of the Military Reaction Force (MRF)88 and whilst these were 
established for the purposes of covert intelligence gathering under each brigade in Northern 
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Ireland, some acted in ways reminiscent of the counter-gangs used against the Mau Mau in 
Kenya and parallels have been repeatedly drawn since.89 Add to this the PIRA counter 
intelligence success of the Four Square Laundry operation and it is clear these were dire days 
for security intelligence in Northern Ireland.90 
Senior figures within the NIO along with Allan Rowley as the new DCI were aware of these 
failures and their damaging political implications as they largely ended during his term. The 
MRF was disbanded in early 1973 and Rowley worked closely with the NIO and the FCO as 
well as successfully opening channels of direct communication with the Irish government 
and, on occasion, their own security forces. This cooperation extended to providing leads the 
Irish could act upon to both seize weapons (e.g. the seizure of the Claudia arms shipment 
from Libya in 1973) and providing information regarding IRA bomb making to the Irish 
Defence Forces’ bomb disposal unit.91 Rowley had a gregarious personality and moved his 
office to Stormont itself which, along with his ‘good fellowship and calmness’,92 allowed him 
to cooperate and therefore co-ordinate intelligence in Northern Ireland better than his 
predecessor. In time, Rowley developed trust between the political and security intelligence 
units that had not existed before and although the structural problem remained (with one 
group in control of security intelligence and another group the political side of the conflict) 
Rowley allowed them to communicate, at least informally. Although no evidence of how 
Rowley was perceived within the police or the army has been identified, the use of 
internment more selectively (and directly by the Secretary of State) from late 1972 until 
1974 meant that ‘virtually all the detainees were members of the IRA and that the MOD had 
more faith in the RUC SB intelligence’93 by the time the practice ended. 
By 1974, a combination of natural rotation and general elections however led to friction 
again. The new Secretary of State Merlyn Rees and his PUS Sir Frank Cooper along with MI6’s 
Michael Oatley arguably made up one coterie supported by Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
that once again pursued talks with the PIRA following the collapse of the Sunningdale 
Agreement in May 1974. The GOC Gen. Sir Frank King, his (now MI5) DCI Denis Payne and for 
other reasons RUC Chief Constable Jamie Flanagan, made up another. From the political 
side, Oatley’s use of Steele’s former contacts in 1974 developed a series of backchannels 
which negotiated another ceasefire with the PIRA in 1975. The terms of the ceasefire, 
reproduced exactly in UK government documents as well as in the papers of Sinn Féin 
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President Ruairí Ó Brádaigh show an interim agreement to stop all searches, arrests and 
otherwise harassment of the Republican Movement94 so that political talks might again 
begin.   
However, the ceasefire, monitored by incident centres run by both the NIO and Sinn Féin, 
provided evidence over a number of months that the security forces were not keeping the 
NIO’s side of the agreement and that the stovepipe had returned.  Ryder and more recently 
Ó Dochartaigh have found that not only were direct orders to soft-pedal ignored, but 
continued (and at times increased) security force patrols and checkpoints were specifically 
designed to interfere with the NIO’s ceasefire talks.95 For Ó Dochartaigh. ‘Ongoing pressure 
from the RUC and the British army made it extremely difficult for the republican leadership 
to restrain local units from what those units characterized as defensive or retaliatory action 
and strengthened 'spoilers' within the republican movement.’96 The NIO incident centres in 
fact recorded 967 complaints about Security Force activity from February to October 1975, 
(though the Security Forces used the same system to complain about republican activity 400 
times)97 and this exacerbated tension between the political intelligence units at the NIO and 
senior elements of the Army and MoD. The tension is most apparent in the fact that the DCI 
is left out of NIO correspondence chains regarding alleged Security Forces harassment 
circulated internally, an issue that demonstrates the re-emergence of a stovepipe separating 
the political from the security responses following Rowley’s departure. The longest note not 
made available to the DCI for example, accuses The Second Battalion The Parachute 
Regiment (‘2 Para’), then stationed in North Belfast, of ‘over playing their hand’ and of being 
unsuited to improving community relations. The note presented excerpts from some of the 
‘15 complaints of assault, mostly serious, in the 6 weeks from 12 July [1975].’98 The author 
concluding, ‘As you know we have suggested a “horses for courses” approach to the MoD in 
the posting of roulement battalions in Northern Ireland. Their reply was predictable but 
disappointing.’99 
With Rowley gone, the Terms of Reference of the DCI were in themselves not capable of 
maintaining the kind of cooperation the first DCI had managed to achieve between military 
and political intelligence. The new DCI, Denis Payne, moved out of Stormont and back to the 
army’s HQNI at Lisburn’s Thiepval Barracks (where Eastwood had previously been stationed 
in 1971) and the stovepipe in which the security and operational intelligence of the RUC 
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Special Branch and Military Intelligence returned.  The return of the post of DCI to an MI5 
officer might have been crucial to this silo mentality re-emerging.  The role of MI5 as a 
security organisation is undoubtedly different from the more active and inquisitive MI6 
approach, and perhaps implies a more urgent and defensive approach to intelligence 
gathering.   These two cultures created two divergent systems in Northern Ireland with one 
often attempting to explore the means by which the conflict might be resolved, the other 
being determined to prosecute that conflict and having an indirect but detrimental impact 
on the other’s approach.    
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The security intelligence stovepipe is undoubtedly important in explaining how security 
policy developed along the lines that it did Northern Ireland. Whilst the NIO and successive 
Secretaries of State recognised that their role often required them to act as both mediators 
and participants in the conflict,100 the severity of the violence from 1970 meant that it is 
understandable that Security Force lives were prioritised by other members of the Security 
Forces over potential peace-feelers from the PIRA. The escalating nature of the conflict 
increased the desire of the Security Forces to pursue and fight what they deemed a criminal 
enemy, and the British Army and RUC needed to maintain a close working partnership 
between their respective intelligence operations despite evident tensions between them.101 
Both the RUC and military security intelligence operations sidelined policy intervention from 
above (the JIC) and from the Northern Ireland Office following Direct Rule in 1972. This 
marginalised the approaches of political intelligencers operating at Laneside. While security 
intelligence is a part (however crucial) of any reasonable explanation for the eventual end to 
the conflict in Northern Ireland102  these two approaches to intelligence need not have been 
considered mutually exclusive and recent research has tended to emphasise how predictable 
the unintended consequences of counter terrorism policies that do not pay attention to 
political realities really are. In the Northern Ireland case the radicalisation of Catholic Irish 
Nationalists after the Falls Road Curfew in 1970, the introduction of internment in 1971,103 
and Bloody Sunday in 1972104 famously radicalised whole sections of their community. 
Indiscriminate counterterrorism killings as well led only to increased overall PIRA 
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bombings.105 This in turn amplified the need for more security intelligence which led, among 
other things, to the abandonment and closure of Laneside and the advent of Police Primacy 
as a policy in Northern Ireland in 1976.  It would take over a decade for the kind of joined-up 
thinking which married social, economic, political and security policy reforms at the NIO to 
develop.106 It was hoped this would create a situation in which the IRA and others could see 
how entering mainstream politics could be more beneficial to their cause than continuing 
with violence. When this approach emerged in the 1990s the change was relatively swift.   
The security stovepipe arguably had little to fear and much to gain even if political 
intelligence could only help induce occasional PIRA ceasefires. By the 1990s certainly this 
was one important area in which MI5 played an important part107 and the PIRA campaign as 
a result gradually flickered and stuttered its way into obsolescence.  That the stovepipe was 
not only allowed to exist but accommodated, despite the brief successes during Alan 
Rowley’s time as DCI, demonstrates that while the NIO lost the argument over who should 
control intelligence they had shown the effectiveness of coordinating the political and 
security intelligence efforts. By working to breakdown the security intelligence stovepipe, 
Rowley had briefly demonstrated the effectiveness of all-source and all-service co-operation 
toward the shared goal of bringing about an agreed and favourable end to the conflict in 
Northern Ireland.  
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